In his seminal work, Cities of Commerce, Oscar Gelderblom has famously argued that urban competition was the driving force behind economically efficient institutions.[1] This blog post examines the different competitive strategies developed by the ‘great skippers’ guilds’ through their admission requirements and further regulations in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Despite the crucial role of inland navigation, systematic and comparative analysis of these guilds remains scarce and relatively old. Historians seem to have often overlooked the role of domestic shipping as a connective element between economic centres, even though the network of rivers and canals constituted a fundamental infrastructure for urbanisation and economic expansion.[2]

By analysing guild charters and ordinances of the great skippers’ guilds in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, this blog post investigates the formal requirements, the implementation of regulation, and their enforcement. It aims to contribute to the question how institutional choices of local guilds could position cities within larger regional networks of commerce and transport.

The analysis of the regulations of great skippers’ guilds in Amsterdam and Rotterdam reveals substantial differences between the cities. They clearly applied different approaches and strategies. The first regulations in Amsterdam stem from 1575, but in 1750 they were rewritten and substantially tightened. In the mid-eighteenth century, both cities shared certain basic entry requirements for the guilds, like citizenship and years of work experience. In Amsterdam, however, especially foreign applicants were subject to much higher admission fees (40 guilders), stricter residence requirements, and more extensive work experience.

In general, guild entry was easier in Rotterdam. It seems that the fierce competition with other cities, like Dordrecht, Rotterdam (in its regulations of 1733) deliberately accepted a more accessible guild structure. Foreigners, who had not lived in Rotterdam for five years nor married a Rotterdam wife, had to pay a maximum of 25 guilders for their guild entry. Amsterdam’s restrictive stance may indicate a desire to preserve existing power structures and to discourage external entry, which would reflect the city’s status as well-established commercial centre.

This more offensive mentality in Rotterdam is also reflected in its approach to other cities. Skippers from cities where Rotterdam’s guild members did not enjoy equal trading rights were prohibited from loading freight in Rotterdam. This regulation was not only legally effective but also economically strategic: it offered the city’s skippers direct protection from unfair competition and implicitly pressured other cities into granting reciprocal market rights. Through such measures, Rotterdam was able to considerably strengthen its trading position in both domestic and international trade. At the same time, the city had to shield guild members more actively from non-guild members.

In Amsterdam, non-guild members were in certain cases permitted to transport goods, provided this involved destination-bound traffic. In Rotterdam, such tolerance was much more restricted: only in the absence of guild members, non-members were allowed to load freight (while still paying a mandatory contribution). By doing so, Rotterdam made guild membership more attractive. In Amsterdam, guild members were obliged to report infractions of the regulations. Regarding the enforcement of the rules, a similar difference is notable. Guild members were obliged to report observed rule violations. However, Rotterdam even offered financial rewards to informants, including non-guild members.

In short, the great skippers’ guild regulations of Rotterdam (1733) and Amsterdam (1750) reveal a notable difference in strategy. In Amsterdam it was relatively difficult to access the guild, while the benefits for members seem rather limited. This seems to endorse the classic image of Amsterdam as a city that has somewhat lost its mercantile spirit. Rotterdam, by contrast, applied an offensive strategy towards other cities. It was easier to access the guild, and there were clear advantages for its members.

This is a guest blog by Tycho Zachariou, based on his bachelor thesis

[1] O. Gelderblom, Cities of Commerce. The Institutional Foundations of International Trade in the Low Countries, 1250-1650 (Princeton University Press, 2013).

[2] H.A.M. Klemann, ‘The Yangtze and the Rhine, two Major Rivers Systems’, TSEG 21 (2024), 5.

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